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ability to dampen economic ﬂuctuations caused by random shocks. A tax rate
rule is also considered. The results show that the estimated interest rate rule
usedinthepaperisstablefortheperiodbeginningin1954exceptfortheearly
Volcker period, although more observations, especially high inﬂation ones,
are needed before much conﬁdence can be placed on the results.
The models used for the stabilization results are large scale structural
macroeconometric models, and some of the results differ from those based
on small models. For example, rules with inﬂation coefﬁcients less than one
are not destabilizing, and rules with large inﬂation coefﬁcients, such as the
Taylorrule, achieveasmallreductionininﬂationvariabilityatacostofalarge
increase in interest rate variability.
1 Introduction
This paper considers three kinds of interest rate rules: estimated, calibrated, and
optimal. The rules are examined for their ability to dampen economic ﬂuctuations
caused by random shocks. A tax rate rule is also considered. The rules are examined
∗CowlesFoundation,YaleUniversity,NewHaven,CT06520-8281. Voice: 203-432-3715;Fax:
203-432-6167; e-mail: ray.fair@yale.edu; website: http://fairmodel.econ.yale.edu.withinthecontextofamulticountrymacroeconometric(MC)modelandtwoversions
of a stand alone United States (US) model. One version of the US model has rational
expectations.
An estimated interest rate rule for the United States is an attempt to approximate
the behavior of the Fed. The left hand side variable is the interest rate that the Fed
is assumed to control, and the right hand side variables are those that are assumed to
affect Fed behavior. The ﬁrst example of an estimated interest rate rule is in Dewald
and Johnson (1963), where the Treasury bill rate is regressed on a constant, the bill
rate lagged once, real GNP, the unemployment rate, the balance of payments deﬁcit,
and the consumer price index. The next example is in Christian (1968), and since
then many rules have been estimated. I added an estimated interest rate rule to my
U.S.econometricmodelinFair(1978), andaversionofthisruleisusedinthepresent
paper. McNees(1986,1992)whenhewasattheBostonFeddidsomeinterestingwork
with estimated rules, where he included among the explanatory variables the Fed’s
internal forecasts of various variables. In the MC model, which was ﬁrst presented
in Fair (1984), there are estimated interest rate rules for the monetary authorities of
other countries. Khoury (1990) provides an extensive list of estimated rules through
1986. Two recent studies are Judd and Rudebusch (1998), where rules are estimated
for various subsets of the 1970–1997 period, and Clarida, Galí, and Gertler (2000),
where rules are estimated for the different Fed chairmen.
By a ‘‘calibrated’’ rule in this paper is meant a rule that is not econometrically
estimated. The most well known calibrated rule is due to Taylor (1993), where the
federal funds rate is equal to 1.0 plus 1.5 times the rate of inﬂation over the previous
2fourquartersplus0.5timesthepercentdeviationofrealGDPfromatarget. Anumber
of studies have examined how calibrated rules perform. The general approach in this
literature is to choose a rule and then use a model of the economy to examine how
the economy would have behaved under the rule. The aim is to ﬁnd a rule that gives
(in some sense) a good overall performance of the economy.1
This paper adds to the literature in the following ways. The ﬁrst concerns the
estimated rule that is used. The hypothesis that the coefﬁcients in this rule are the
same in the 1954:1–1979:3 and 1982:4–1999:2 periods is tested and not rejected.
The passing of a stability test like this is contrary to the general view in the recent
literature that estimated interest rate rules do not have stable coefﬁcients over time.
For example, Judd and Rudebusch (1998, p. 3) state ‘‘Overall, it appears that there
have not been any great successes in modeling Fed behavior with a single, stable
reaction function.’’
Second, themodelsoftheeconomythatareusedforthestabilizationexperiments
are large scale structural macroeconometric models. The MC and US models that
are used have been extensively tested, including testing for rational expectations,
and they appear to be good approximations of the economy.2 Most recent studies
have used very small models, sometimes only two to four equations and sometimes
calibrated rather than estimated. For example, only one of the studies in Taylor
1See, for example, Feldstein and Stock (1993), Hall and Mankiw (1993), Judd and Motley
(1993), Clark (1994), Croushore and Stark (1994), Thorton (1995), Fair and Howrey (1996),
Rudebusch (1999), Clarida, Galí, and Gertler (2000), and the papers in Taylor (1999). Taylor
(1985, fn. 1, p. 61) cites much of the literature prior to 1985.
2See, for example, the tests in Fair (1994) and the tests on the website listed in the introductory
footnote. The rational expectations tests are brieﬂy discussed in the appendix.
3(1999)—Levin, Wieland, and Williams (1999) (LWW)—uses large scale models.
LWW use linearizations of the Federal Reserve model and the Taylor multicountry
model to compute unconditional second moments of the variables in the models. In
the recent study of Clarida, Galí, and Gertler (2000) a four equation calibrated model
is used. It will be seen that judging interest rate rules can be sensitive to the economic
model used. Using small calibrated models to make policy conclusions may be risky
if the models are at odds with more empirically based models.
Third, a tax rate rule is examined. Although ﬁscal policy rules are seldom dis-
cussed in the literature on rules, it will be seen that such rules can be of considerably
help to monetary policy in its stabilization effort.
Finally, the paper shows that it is computationally feasible to use large scale
nonlinear models to analyze questions that have mostly been analyzed using small
linear models. The methods in this paper are computer intensive, but computer time
is cheap.
The MC and US models are discussed in the appendix. The estimated rule is
discussed in the next section, and the calibrated rules are presented in Section 3. The
stochastic simulation and optimal control procedures are discussed in Section 4, and
the stabilization results are presented in Sections 5 and 6.
2 The Estimated Rule
The rule that I added to my U.S. macroeconometric model in 1978 has been changed
slightly over time. The main modiﬁcation that has been made is the addition of a
4dummy variable term to account for the change in Fed operating procedure during
period1979:4–1982:3(tobecalledthe‘‘earlyVolcker’’period).3 Thestatedpolicyof
the Fed during this period was that it was focusing more on monetary aggregates than
it had done in the past. The estimated interest rate rule already had the lagged growth
ofthemoneysupplyasanexplanatoryvariable,andthechangeinpolicywasmodeled
by adding the lagged growth of the money supply multiplied by a dummy variable as
another explanatory variable. The dummy variable is 1 for the 1979:4–1982:3 period
and 0 otherwise.
The speciﬁcation of the rule that is used in this paper is:
r = α1 + α2 ˙ p + α3u + α4 u + α5 ˙ m−1 + α6D1 ×˙ m−1
+α7r−1 + α8 r−1 + α9 r−2 +  
(1)
where r is the three month Treasury bill rate, ˙ p is the quarterly rate of inﬂation at an
annualrate,uistheunemploymentrate, ˙ misthequarterlyrateofgrowthofthemoney
supply at an annual rate, and D1 equals 1 for 1979:4–1982:3 and 0 otherwise. The
estimates of equation (1) for three different sample periods are presented in Table 1.4
The endogenous variables on the right hand side of equation (1) are inﬂation and
theunemploymentrate,andtwostageleastsquareswasusedtoestimatetheequation.
3Paul Volcker was chair of the Fed between 1979:3 and 1987:2, but the period in question is
only 1979:4–1982:3.
4The data that were used for all the estimates and tests in this section, including the data on the
ﬁrst stage regressors, are available from the website. The results can be duplicated by downloading
the data and some software from the website. The price variable that is used to construct the
inﬂation variable is the price deﬂator for domestic sales. This variable was used in Fair (1978)
and has been used ever since in the equation. The three month Treasury bill rate is used for the
interest rate. Although in practice the Fed controls the federal funds rate, the quarterly average of
the federal funds rate and the quarterly average of the three month Treasury bill rate are so highly
correlated that it makes little difference which rate is used in estimated interest rate rules using
quarterly data. The money supply data are taken from the ﬂow of funds accounts.
5Table 1
Estimated U.S. Interest Rate Rule
Dependent Variable is r
1954:1–1999:2 1954:1–1979:2 1982:4–1999:2 1954:1–1999:2
182 obs. 103 obs. 67 obs. 182 obs.
Coef. t-stat. Coef. t-stat. Coef. t-stat. Coef. t-stat.
constant .895 5.60 .745 3.24 .402 1.89 .738 4.32
˙ p .070 3.94 .070 2.87 .115 3.03 .078 4.13
u -.143 -4.47 -.111 -2.89 -.080 -1.97 -.126 -3.92
 u -.856 -6.59 -.383 -2.98 -.925 -4.81 -.706 -5.28
˙ m−1 .012 1.89 .027 3.48 .001 0.08 .008 1.42
D1 ×˙ m−1 .218 9.59 −− .328 7.91
r−1 .922 46.72 .894 22.02 .942 36.76 .926 38.52
 r−1 .194 3.40 .253 2.86 .301 3.16 .298 4.63
 r−2 -.352 -6.77 -.229 -2.55 -.191 -2.25 -.362 -7.26
D1 ×˙ p -.121 -2.76
D2 ×˙ p .044 1.37
SE .475 .415 .313 .454
R2 .971 .959 .971 .974
DW 1.83 1.86 2.05 2.09
Wald (p-value) 10.31 (.244)
Estimation period: 1954:1–1999:2
Estimation technique: two stage least squares
r = three month Treasury bill rate
˙ p = inﬂation rate
u = unemployment rate
˙ m = growth rate of the money supply
D1 = 1 for 1979:4–1982:3; 0 otherwise
D2 = 1 for 1982:4–1999:2; 0 otherwise
In the ﬁrst stage regression inﬂation and the unemployment rate are regressed on a
set of predetermined variables (the main variables in the US model). The predicted
values from these regressions are then used in the second stage. One can look on the
these regressions as those used by the Fed to predict inﬂation and the unemployment
rate, and so it need not be assumed that the Fed has perfect foresight.
If the Fed’s expectations of future values of inﬂation and the unemployment rate
6affect its current decision, these expectations should be added to equation (1). A way
to test this is to add future values of inﬂation and the unemployment rate to equation
(1) and then estimate the equation by Hansen’s (1982) method of moments estimator,
where the instruments used are the main predetermined variables in the US model.
Hansen’s method in this context is just two stage least squares adjusted to account
for the serial correlation properties of the error term. The test is to see if the future
values are statistically signiﬁcant. I have performed this test on various versions of
my estimated interest rate rules using different lead lengths, and the led values do not
turn out to be signiﬁcant.5 There is thus no evidence that future values are needed
in equation (1), and they have not been used. Clarida, Galí, and Gertler (2000) use
future values in many of their speciﬁcations, but they point out (p. 164) that their
conclusions are not changed if they don’t use future values.
Equation (1) is a ‘‘leaning against the wind’’ equation. r is estimated to de-
pend positively on the inﬂation rate and the lagged growth of the money supply and
negatively on the unemployment rate and the change in the unemployment rate. Ad-
justmentandsmoothingeffectsarecapturedbythelaggedvaluesofr. Thecoefﬁcient
on lagged money supply growth is over ten times larger for the early Volcker period
thaneitherbeforeorafter, whichisconsistentwiththeFed’sstatedpolicyoffocusing
more on monetary aggregates during this period. This way of accounting for the Fed
policy shift does not, of course, capture the richness of the change in behavior, but at
least it seems to capture some of the change.
The Wald value in Table 1 is for the test of the hypothesis that the coefﬁcients in
5See Chapter 5 Fair (1994) for the use of this test. The latest tests are on the website.
7the 1954:1–1979:3 period are the same as those in the 1982:4–1999:2 period. (The
earlyVolcker period is excluded from this test, and so the D1 term is excluded.) The
Wald statistic is presented in equation (3.6) in Andrews and Fair (1988). It has the
advantage that it works under very general assumptions about the properties of the
error terms and can be used when the estimator is two stage least squares, which it
is here. The Wald statistic is distributed as χ2 with (in the present case) 8 degrees
of freedom. The estimates of the equation for the two sub periods are presented in
Table 1. The value of the Wald statistic is 10.31, which hasapv alue of .244. The
hypothesis of equality is thus not rejected at even the 10 percent level.6
Equation (1), estimated for the entire 1954:1–1999:2 period, was put through a
numberofothertests.7 First,thelaggedvaluesofallthevariablesintheequation(r−4,
˙ p−1, u−2, ˙ m−2, D1 ×˙ m−2) were added and the joint signiﬁcance of these variables
tested. The χ2 value was 6.34 with 5 degrees of freedom, which hasapv alue of
.275. Adding these variables encompasses a number of alternative hypotheses about
the dynamics,8 and these hypotheses are rejected in that the added variables are not
signiﬁcant. Second, the equation was estimated under the assumption of ﬁrst order
6ItisalsothecasethattheexactspeciﬁcationoftheinterestrateruleinFair(1978)(equation(1),
p. 1170), which was speciﬁed more than 20 years ago, passes the stability test. This speciﬁcation
differs from the one above in the following ways: 1) the inﬂation rate is lagged once rather than
unlagged, 2) a different measure of labor market tightness is used from the unemployment rate, 3)
outputgrowthlaggedonceandoutputgrowthlaggedtwiceareincludedinplaceofthechangeinthe
unemployment rate, 4)  r lagged once and twice are not included, and 5) the equation is estimated
under the assumption of ﬁrst order serial correlation of the error term. (The dummy variable term
is, of course, not included since this was before 1979.) When the Wald test was performed using
this speciﬁcation, the value of the test statistic was even lower (8.29 versus 10.31 in Table 1), with
the same number of degrees of freedom (8).
7See Fair (1994), Chapter 4, for a general discussion of these kinds of tests.
8See Hendry, Pagan, and Sargan (1984).
8serial correlation of the error term. The χ2 value was 1.32 with 1 degree of freedom,
which hasapv alue of .251. Third, the percentage change in real GDP was added
(without excluding the change in the unemployment rate). The χ2 value was 0.20
with1degreeoffreedom,whichhasapv alueof.653. Finally,anoutputgapvariable9
andthechangeinthisvariablewereadded(withoutexcludingtheunemploymentrate
and the change in the unemployment rate). The χ2 value was 4.68 with 2 degrees of
freedom, which hasapv alue of .096. Overall, the equation does well in these tests.
The added variables, including the output gap and the change in the output gap, do
not have additional explanatory power.
Returning to the stability test, the passing of this test is contrary to the general
viewintheliterature,mentionedabove. Onelikelyreasonthatthestabilityhypothesis
has generally been rejected in the literature is that most tests have included the early
Volcker period, which is clearly different from the periods both before and after. The
tests in Judd and Rudebusch (1998), for example, include the early Volcker period.
Clarida, Galí, and Gertler (2000) (CGG) do not perform any stability tests; they
simplynotethatthecoefﬁcientestimatesforthedifferentperiodslookquitedifferent,
especially the inﬂation coefﬁcient. The equations for the two sub periods in Table 1
also show a large difference in the inﬂation coefﬁcient. For the ﬁrst sub period the
long run coefﬁcient is 0.66 [= .070/(1.0 - .894)], and for the second sub period it
is 1.98 [= .115/(1.0 - .942)]. The CGG coefﬁcients (p. 150) are .83 for their pre-
Volckerperiod(1960:1–1979:2)and2.15fortheirVolcker-Greenspanperiod(1979:3–
1996:4).
9The output gap measure used is (YS − Y)/YS, where Y is actual output and YSis a measure
of potential output. These variables are in the US model on the website.
9Although the inﬂation coefﬁcients seem quite different in Table 1, the Wald test
does not reject the hypothesis of stability. It could be, however, that the test has low
power, and so another test was performed. This test is represented in the last two




for D1 ×˙ p is the estimated difference between the earlyVolcker period and the ﬁrst
period. This difference is not of much interest, since the added variable is just meant
to dummy out the early Volcker period. The estimated difference is negative and
signiﬁcant (t-statistic of -2.76). The total coefﬁcient for this period is -0.043 [= .078 -
.121]. Thisnegativevalueisnotsensible, whichreﬂectsthefactthattheearlyVolcker
period is unusual and hard to model. (This is the reason the period was completely
ignored for the Wald test.)
ThecoefﬁcientestimateforD2×˙ p istheestimateddifferencebetweenthesecond
period and the ﬁrst. This estimated difference is .044 with a t-statistic of 1.37, which
is not signiﬁcant. Again, the long run inﬂation coefﬁcient for the second period of
1.65 [= .078 + .044)/(1 - .926)] is noticeably larger than that for the ﬁrst period of
1.05 [= .078/(1 - .926)].
The results thus show a large economic but not statistically signiﬁcant difference
for the inﬂation coefﬁcient between the ﬁrst and second periods. One fact that is
important to keep in mind is that the variance of inﬂation is much smaller in the
second period than in the ﬁrst. The largest value of inﬂation in the second period is
105.33 percent in 1990:1, and no other value is above 5 percent. On the other hand, the
largest value for the ﬁrst period is 12.83 percent in 1974:3, and 29 other values are
above 5 percent.
An interesting test of whether there has been a structural change in Fed behavior
will be if inﬂation rises substantially in the future. The third equation in Table 1
implies a much larger Fed response than does the ﬁrst equation, and the test will be
which equation better predicts the actual Fed response. If the third equation predicts
better, this will be strong evidence in favor of a shift in behavior from the earlier
period. If the ﬁrst equation predicts better, this will suggest that focusing only on
the period since 1982, when inﬂation has been low, has given misleading estimates
(in effect, a small sample problem). In short, although the statistical tests in this
section suggest that there has not been a shift of behavior, more observations are
needed, particularly high inﬂation ones, before much conﬁdence can be placed on
any conclusion. For the following stabilization results the ﬁrst equation in Table 1
has been used, since this currently seems supported by the data.
3 The Calibrated Rules
Two calibrated rules are examined. The ﬁrst is Taylor’s (1993) rule mentioned in
Section 1. In the present context this rule is:
r = r∗ + 0.5 ∗ 100[(Y − Y∗)/Y∗] + 1.5 ∗ 100( ˙ P4 − ˙ P4
∗) (2)
where Y is real GDP, ˙ P4 is the four-quarter percentage change in the GDP deﬂator,
and ∗ denotes a base value. The key feature of this rule is that output deviations are
11weighted 0.5 and inﬂation deviations are weighted 1.5.
The second calibrated rule is a rule I used in Fair (1998, p. 95). This rule differs
from the Taylor rule in two respects. First, the inﬂation variable is the one-quarter
rateofinﬂation(atanannualrate)insteadofthefour-quarterrate. Second, theweight
on inﬂation is 0.25 instead of 1.5. The rule is thus:
r = r∗ + 0.5 ∗ 100[(Y − Y∗)/Y∗] + 0.25 ∗ 100( ˙ P − ˙ P ∗) (3)
where ˙ P is the one-quarter percentage change in the GDP deﬂator at an annual rate.
(All percentage changes in this paper are at annual rates.) This rule will be called the
‘‘.25 rule,’’ since the weight on inﬂation is 0.25.
4 Stochastic Simulation and Optimal Control
The Stochastic Simulation Procedure
The focus in this paper, as in much of the literature, is on variances, not means. The
aim of monetary policy is taken to smooth the effects of shocks. In order to examine
theabilityofmonetarypolicytodothis,oneneedsanestimateofthelikelyshocksthat
monetary policy would need to smooth, and this can be done by means of stochastic
simulation. Givenaneconometricmodel, shockscanbegeneratedbydrawingerrors.
Of the 365 stochastic equations in the MC model, 195 are quarterly and 170 are
annual. There is an estimated error term for each of these equations for each period.
Although the equations do not all have the same estimation period, the period 1976–
121996 is common to almost all equations.10 There are thus available 21 vectors of
annual error terms and 84 vectors of quarterly error terms. These vectors are taken as
estimates of the economic shocks, and they are drawn in the manner discussed below.
Since these vectors are vectors of the historical shocks, they pick up the historical
correlations of the error terms. If, for example, shocks in two consumption equations
are highly positively correlated, the error terms in the two equations will tend to be
high together or low together.
The period used for the stabilization experiments is 1993:1–1998:4, six years or
24 quarters. Since the concern here is with stabilization around base paths and not
with positions of the base paths themselves, it does not matter much which path is
chosen for the base path. The choice here is simply to take as the base path the
historicalpath. Thisbasepathcanbegeneratedbysimplyaddingthehistoricalerrors
to the equations and taking them to be exogenous. When this is done, the solution of
themodelusingtheactualvaluesofalltheexogenousvariablesistheperfecttracking
solution. Forallthestochasticsimulationsinthispaperthehistoricalerrorsareadded
to the model and the draws are around these errors.
Each trial for the stochastic simulation is a dynamic deterministic simulation for
1993:1–1998:4 using a particular draw of the error terms. For each of the six years
for a given trial an integer is drawn between 1 and 21 with probability 1/21 for each
integer. Thisdrawdetermineswhichofthe21vectorsofannualerrortermsisusedfor
thatyear. Thefourvectorsofquarterlyerrortermsusedarethefourthatcorrespondto
that year. Each trial is thus based on drawing six integers. The solution of the model
10Forthefewequationswhoseestimationperiodsbeganlaterorendedearlierthanthe1976–1996
period, zero errors were used for the missing observations.
13for this trial is an estimate of what the world economy would have been like had the
particulardrawnerrortermsactuallyoccurred. (Rememberthatthedrawnerrorterms
are on top of the historical error terms for 1993:1–1998:4, which are always used.)
The number of trials taken is 20, so 20 world economic outcomes for 1993:1–1998:4
are available for analysis.11
For the US model alone, which is completely quarterly, historical errors are avail-
able for the 1954:1–1999:2 period (182 quarters), and these errors were used for the
draws. Each vector of quarterly errors had a probability of 1/182 of being drawn.
Not counting the estimated interest rate rule, there are 29 estimated equations in the
US model plus the export (EX) and price of imports (PIM) equations discussed
in the appendix—equations (8) and (9). Although these latter two equations are not
estimated in the traditional way and have zero errors by construction, ‘‘historical’’
errors were created for them and were used for the draws. The historical errors used
for equation (8) were taken to be the errors in a regression of logEX on a constant,
time trend, and the ﬁrst four lagged values of logEX. The estimation period was
1954:1–1999:2. Similarly, the historical errors used for equation (9) were taken to
be the errors in a regression of logPIMon a constant, time trend, and the ﬁrst four
laggedvaluesoflogPIM. Otherwise,theprocedureusedfortheUSmodelisexactly
11Another way of drawing error terms would be from an estimated distribution. Let ˆ V be an
estimate of the 365×365 covariance matrix V of the error terms. One could, for example, assume
that the error terms are multivariate normal and draw errors from the N( ˆ µt, ˆ V) distribution, where
ˆ µt is the vector of the historical errors for t. Because of the quarterly-annual difference, ˆ V would
have to be taken to be block diagonal, one quarterly block and one annual block. Even for this
matrix, however, there are not enough observations to estimate all the nonzero elements, and so
many other zero restrictions would have to be imposed. The advantage of drawing the historical
error vectors is that no distributional assumption has to be made and no zero restrictions have to be
imposed.
14the same as that used for the overall MC model.
When the estimated rule is used for the stabilization experiments, the historical
errorsareaddedtoit,butnoerrorsaredrawnforit. Addingthehistoricalerrorsmeans
that when the model inclusive of the rule is solved with no errors for any equation
drawn, a perfect tracking solution results. Not drawing errors for the rule means that
the Fed does not behave randomly but simply follows the rule. The same procedure
was followed for the Taylor rule and the .25 rule.
If in the stabilization experiments any rule called for a value of the interest rate
lessthan1.0percentagepoint,avalueof1.0percentagepointwasused. Forparticular
shocks a rule may call for very small values of the interest rate, including negative
values, and this procedure insures that these values are never used. In practice it
seems unlikely that the Fed would lower interest rates much below 1.0 percentage
point, and so this constraint was imposed on the model.
Lety
j
t bethepredictedvalueofendogenousvariabley forquartert ontrialj, and
let y∗
t be the base (actual) value. How best to summarize the 20 × 24 values of y
j
t ?









t )2, where J is the total number of trials.12 The
problem with this measure, however, is that there are 24 values per variable, which
12Ify∗
t weretheestimatedmeanofyt, thismeasurewouldbetheestimatedvarianceofyt.G i v e n
the J values of y
j




t , and for a nonlinear model it is not
the case that this mean equals y∗
t even as J goes to inﬁnity. As an empirical matter, however, the
difference in these two values is quite small for almost all macroeconometric models, and so it is
approximately the case that the above measure of variability is the estimated variance.

















L is a measure of the deviation of the variable from its base values over the whole
period.13
The Optimal Control Procedure
The optimal control methodology requires that a loss function be postulated for the
Fed. For the loss function used here the Fed is assumed to weight output and inﬂation
deviations equally and to care about interest rate ﬂuctuations. In particular, the loss
for quarter t is assumed to be:
Ht = 0.5 ∗ 100[(Y − Y∗)/Y∗]2 + 0.5 ∗ 100( ˙ P − ˙ P ∗)2 + α( rt −  r∗
t )2
+1.0/(rt − 0.999) + 1.0/(16.001 − rt)
(6)
where Y is real GDP, ˙ P is the percentage change in the GDP deﬂator, and ∗ denotes
a base value. The last two terms in (6) insure that the optimal values of r will be
between 1.0 and 16.0. The value of α was chosen by experimentation. Two values
were chosen, 2.0 and 9.0. A value of 2.0 results in a value of L for r roughly the same
as the value obtained by the Taylor rule, and a value of 9.0 results in a value of L for
13L is, of course, not an estimated variance. Aside from the fact that for a nonlinear model the
mean of yt is not y∗
t , Lj is an average across a number of quarters or years, and variances are not
in general constant across time. L is just a summary measure of variability.
16r roughly the same as the values obtained by the estimated and .25 rules. This choice
is discussed in the next section.
Assume that the control period of interest is 1 through T, where in this paper 1
is 1993:1 and T is 1998:4. Although this is the control period of interest, in order
not to have to assume that life ends in T, the control problem should be thought of
as one of minimizing the expected value of
T+n
t=1 Ht, where n is chosen to be large
enough to avoid unusual end-of-horizon effects near T. The overall control problem
should thus be thought of as choosing values of r that minimize the expected value
of
T+n
t=1 Ht subject to the model used.
If the model used is linear and the loss function quadratic, it is possible to derive
analytically optimal feedback equations for the control variables.14 In general, how-
ever, optimal feedback equations cannot be derived for nonlinear models or for loss
functions with nonlinear constraints on the instruments, and a numerical procedure
must be used. The following procedure was used for the results in this paper. It is
based on a sequence of solutions of deterministic control problems, one sequence per
trial. The US model is used.
Recall what a trial for the stochastic simulation is. A trial is a set of draws
of 24 vectors of error terms, one vector per quarter. Given this set, the model is
solved dynamically for the 24 quarters using a particular interest rate rule. This entire
procedure is then repeated 20 times (the chosen number of trials), at which time the
summary statistics are computed. As will now be discussed, each trial for the optimal
control procedure requires that 24 deterministic control problems be solved, and so
14See, for example, Chow (1981).
17with 20 trials, 480 solutions are required.
For purposes of solving the control problems, the Fed is assumed to know the
model (its structure and coefﬁcient estimates) and the exogenous variables, both past
and future. The Fed is assumed not to know the future values of any endogenous
variable or any error draw when solving the control problems.15 The Fed is assumed
to know the error draws for the ﬁrst quarter for each solution. This is consistent with
theuseoftheaboverules, wheretheerrordrawsforthequarterareusedwhensolving
the model with the rule.
The procedure for solving the overall control problem is as follows.
1. Drawavectoroferrorsforquarter1,andaddtheseerrorstotheequations. Take
theerrorsforquarters2throughk tobetheirhistoricalvalues(nodraws),where
k is deﬁned shortly. Choose values of r for quarters 1 through k that minimize
k
t=1 Ht subject to the model as just described. This is just a deterministic
optimal control problem, which can be solved, for example, by the method
in Fair (1974). Let r∗
1 denote the optimal value of r for quarter 1 that results
from this solution. The value of k should be chosen to be large enough so that
making it larger has a negligible effect on r∗
1. (This value can be chosen ahead
of time by experimentation.) r∗
1 is a value that the Fed could have computed at
the beginning of quarter 1 (assuming the model and exogenous variables were
known) having knowledge of the error draws for quarter 1, but not for future
quarters.
2. Record the solution values from the model for quarter 1 using r∗
1 and the error
draws. Thesesolutionvaluesarewhatthemodelestimateswouldhaveoccurred
in quarter 1 had the Fed chosen r∗
1 and had the error terms been as drawn.
3. Repeatsteps1and2forthecontrolproblembeginninginquarter2, thenforthe
control problem beginning in quarter 3, and so on through the control problem
15Given that EXand PIMare taken to be endogenous, the main exogenous variables in the US
model are ﬁscal policy variables. The other exogenous variables are either unimportant or easy to
forecast. Remember that since the base is the perfect tracking solution, the historical errors are
always added to the model.
18beginning in quarter T. For an arbitrary beginning quarter s, use the solution
values of all endogenous variables for quarters s − 1 and back, as well as the
values of r∗
s−1 and back.
4. Steps 1 through 3 constitute one trial, i.e., one set of T drawn vectors of errors.
Do these steps again for another set of T drawn vectors. Keep doing this until
the speciﬁed number of trials has been completed.
The solution values of the endogenous variables carried along for a given trial





All the results are presented in Table 2, and the rest of this paper is essentially a
discussion of this table. Values of L are presented for real GDP, the level of the GDP
deﬂator, the percentage change in the GDP deﬂator, the unemployment rate, and r.
The following discussion will focus on real GDP, the level of the GDP deﬂator, and
r. The results for the unemployment rate are similar to the results for real GDP, and
no further discussion is needed about the unemployment rate. The results for the
percentage change in the GDP deﬂator are generally similar to the results for the
16The optimal control procedure just outlined differs somewhat for the procedure used in Fair
and Howrey (1996, pp. 178-179). In Fair and Howrey (1996) the Fed is assumed not to know the
exogenous variable values, but instead to use estimated autoregressive equations to predict these
values for the current and future quarters. Also, the Fed is assumed not to know the error draws
for the current quarter when solving its problem. In addition, stochastic simulation is not done.
Instead, the error terms are set to zero (instead of to their historical values), the target values are
taken to be the historical means (instead of the actual values), and the (one) trial uses for the error





YP ˙ PUr Y + ˙ P
1. No rule 4.28 3.57 2.02 1.42 0.00 6.30
2. Estimated rule 3.35 3.10 1.77 1.12 1.42 5.12
3. Taylor rule 3.39 2.37 1.64 1.14 3.06 5.03
4. .25 rule 3.28 3.06 1.77 1.12 1.10 5.05
Part 2
MC Model, Interest Income Exogenous
1. No rule 4.16 3.65 2.02 1.37 0.00 6.28
2. Estimated rule 2.76 3.06 1.74 0.92 1.10 4.50
3. Taylor rule 2.99 2.10 1.59 1.02 2.59 4.58
4. .25 rule 2.62 2.96 1.72 0.94 0.90 4.34
5. Est. & tax rules 2.37 3.10 1.93 0.83 0.94 4.30
Part 3
US Model, Interest Income Exogenous
1. No rule 5.38 1.42 1.99 1.19 0.00 7.37
2. Estimated rule 4.12 0.69 1.80 0.83 1.14 5.92
3. Taylor rule 4.04 0.61 1.90 0.92 2.86 5.94
4. .25 rule 3.57 0.71 1.74 0.83 1.19 5.31
5. Optimal (α = 2.0) 2.89 0.81 1.82 0.77 2.86 4.71
6. Optimal (α = 9.0) 3.69 0.81 1.88 0.96 1.42 5.57
Part 4
US-RE Model, Interest Income Exogenous
1. No rule 4.75 1.25 1.96 1.06 0.00 6.71
2. Estimated rule 3.50 0.64 1.74 0.69 1.00 5.24
3. Taylor rule 3.10 0.58 1.80 0.69 2.16 4.90
4. .25 rule 3.17 0.69 1.72 0.74 1.04 4.89
Y = real GDP
P = GDP deﬂator
˙ P = percentage change in the GDP deﬂator
U = unemployment rate
r = three month Treasury bill rate
Simulation period = 1993:1–1998:4level, although in some cases the differences in L across rules are fairly small for the
percentage change.17
The sum of L for Y and ˙ P is also presented in Table 2. Note, however, that
this sum is not what the optimal control procedure minimizes. The loss function in
(6) includes interest rate ﬂuctuations, and a sequence of optimal control problems is
solved, not just one.
Part 1
Part 1 of the table contains results using the complete MC model. Line 1 uses no
rule (r is exogenous); line 2 uses the estimated rule; line 3 uses the Taylor rule; and
line 4 uses the .25 rule. All the experiments using the MC model are based on the
samesetoferrordraws,whichconsiderablylessensstochasticsimulationerroracross
experiments.
L for real GDP falls from 4.28 for no rule, to 3.35 for the estimated rule, to 3.39
for the Taylor rule, and to 3.28 for the .25 rule. For the GDP deﬂator the fall is from
3.57 to 3.10, 2.37, and 3.06, respectively. For r the values for the three rules are 1.42,
3.06, and 1.10, respectively. The conclusions that emerge from these results are the
following.
17Although not reported in Table 2, experiments were run in which the price term in the rule
used the price level rather than the percentage change in the price level. In other words, the target
was the price level instead of the inﬂation rate. The values of L were not noticeably affected by
this change. This lack of sensitivity is consistent with the results in Fair (2000, Table 6), where it
is shown that price equations with vastly different long run properties can have very similar short
run properties. The present exercise is essentially a short run one, and it makes little practical
difference whether a rule (or optimal control procedure) targets the price level or the percentage
change in the price level.
211. All three rules are better than no rule.
2. The results for the estimated and .25 rules are quite close.
3. The Taylor rule has lower variability for the GDP deﬂator but much higher
variability for r. Although not shown in the table, in some cases theTaylor rule
called for values of r below 1.0, sometimes negative values, and in these cases
a value of 1.0 was used.18 The other two rules never called for a value below
1.0. This conclusion is discussed further at the end of this section.
Part 2
Part 2 of the table contains results using the MC model with interest payments for
the U.S. ﬁrm and government sectors taken to be exogenous. As discussed in the
appendix, this is the case where there is no interest income effect on U.S. households,
which increases the effectiveness of monetary policy for a given change in r. (Ignore
line 5 in Part 2 for now.) The pattern of results in Part 2 is similar to the pattern in
Part 1, and so little needs to be added. Monetary policy is more effective in Part 2
than in Part 1 in the sense that for a given rule the decreases in the variability of real
GDP and the GDP deﬂator are larger even though the variability of r is smaller.
Part 3
Part 3 of the table contains results using the stand alone US model. To save space,
only the results with interest payments taken to be exogenous are presented. Part 3
is thus comparable to Part 2. All the experiments using the US model are based on
the same set of error draws, although this is a different set than that used for the MC
18When 1.0 is used for r, this is the value used in the computation of L, not the value implied
by the rule.
22model. The pattern of results in Part 3 is similar to that in Part 2. One noticeable
difference is that the values of L for the GDP deﬂator are considerably smaller in
Part 3 than in Part 2. One reason for this—perhaps the main reason—is that the US
model experiments (unlike the MC model experiments) draw errors from the 1950s
and 1960s, and there were fewer large price shocks in the 1950s and 1960s than later.
Although the level of variability for the GDP deﬂator is lower in Part 3 than in Part
2, the pattern of changes in variability across rules is similar.
ThemaininterestinPart3istheoptimalcontrolexperiments. Theﬁrstexperiment
(line 5) uses a value of α in the loss function in (6) of 2.0. This results in a value of
L for r of 2.86, which is the same as that for the Taylor rule. This experiment is thus
most closely comparable to the use of the Taylor rule. Compared to the Taylor rule,
the variability of output is lower (2.89 versus 4.04) and the variability of the price
level is higher (0.81 versus 0.61).
The second optimal control experiment (line 6) uses a value of α in the loss
function in (6) of 9.0. This results in a value of L for r of 1.42, slightly higher than
the values for the estimated and .25 rules (1.14 and 1.19). Compared to the estimated
rule, the variability of output for the optimal control procedure is lower (3.69 versus
4.12) and the variability of the price level is higher (0.81 versus 0.69). The .25 rule
does slightly better overall than does the optimal control procedure (for α = 9.0),
although the results are close.
23Part 4
Finally, Part 4 of the table contains results using the RE version of the US model,
again with interest payments taken to be exogenous. In order to make Part 4 as
comparable as possible to Part 3, the RE version was set up in the following way.
First, the same error draws were used for the US-RE experiments as were used for
the US experiments. This means that for the six equations that are different for the
RE version—three consumption equations, the import equation, and two long term
interest rate equations—the drawn errors are errors from the original equations, not
from the RE versions. Again, the use of the same errors lessens stochastic simulation
error. Second,thesamecoefﬁcientswereusedfortheREversionsoftheconsumption
and import equations as were used for the original equations except for the income
variable. The coefﬁcient used for each of the four future income variables in each
equation was taken to be one fourth of the coefﬁcient of the current income variable
in the original equation. The total income effect is thus the same between the two
versions, other things being equal, but it is spread out in the future for the RE version.
Thetwolongterminterestrateequations,ontheotherhand,werecompletelychanged.
In the RE version, each long term rate is the average of the current and seven future
values of r.
The RE version of the model is solved as follows. Consider trial 1. The errors for
quarter 1, but not for any future quarters, are drawn. The model is solved for quarter
1 using the extended path method in Fair and Taylor (1983, 1990). This solution
requires solving the model for many quarters in the future. Since errors are drawn
only for quarter 1, agents are assumed not to know the future draws when forming
24their expectations of the future in quarter 1. They are, however, assumed to know
the future values of the exogenous variables (mostly ﬁscal policy variables). After
quarter 1 is solved, errors are drawn for quarter 2, and the model is solved for quarter
2 using the extended path method. The solution values for quarter 1 are used as initial
conditions for this solution. This process is repeated through quarter 24. This then
ﬁnishes one trial. The entire process is then repeated for 19 more trials. There are
thus a total of 24 × 20 = 480 times in which the model is solved using the extended
path method.
The pattern of results in Part 4 in Table 2 is similar to that in Part 3. The overall
results are thus not very sensitive to the present use of the RE assumption. Monetary
policyis, however, slightlymoreeffectiveundertheREassumptioninthatforagiven
rule the value of L for r is smaller in Part 4 than in Part 3 and yet the decreases in
output and price variability are similar or slightly larger. The main reason for this is
that long term rates respond faster to r changes in the RE version, which then makes
consumption and import demand respond faster. There is also a larger income effect
on demand because future income changes are larger than just the current income
change (because of lags in the model). Overall, however, the differences are fairly
modest, and they do not change the basic pattern of results.
General Discussion
An important result above is that the Taylor rule, which has a large coefﬁcient on
inﬂation, when compared to the other two rules, which have much smaller inﬂation
coefﬁcients,achievesafairlysmallreductionininﬂationvariabilityatacostofalarge
25increaseininterestratevariability. Someinsightintothisresultcanbegleanedfroma
property of the price equation in the US model, which is that the price level responds
only modestly to demand (a common feature of most estimated price equations).
Since the interest rate primarily affects the price level through its effects on demand,
the price level responds only modestly to interest rate changes. Since the Taylor rule
has a large coefﬁcient on inﬂation, a large price shock leads to a large change in the
interest rate, but this in turn has only a modest effect in offsetting the effects of the
price shock. For the other two rules the interest rate responds much less to a price
shock, and so the interest rate variance is smaller. The cost of a smaller interest rate
response in terms of offsetting the effects of the price shock is modest because of the
modest effect of the interest rate on the price level.
CGG show, using a four equation calibrated model of the economy, that interest
rate rules that have inﬂation coefﬁcients less than one can be destabilizing. Why
aren’t the estimated and .25 rules destabilizing, as they would be in the CGG model?
The answer is that the response of output to a price shock is much different in the
CGG model than it is in the US model. Consider a positive price shock with no
change in the nominal interest rate. In the CGG model this is expansionary because
the real interest rate, which has a negative effect on output, is lower. In the US model,
on the other hand, a positive price shock with no change in the nominal interest rate
is contractionary. In the short run the aggregate price level rises more than do wage
rates, and so there is a fall in real income. Real wealth also falls. These effects are
contractionary on demand. In addition, the empirical results suggest that households
respond to nominal interest rates and not real interest rates, and so there is no positive
26householdresponsetolowerrealinterestrates. Theneteffectofapositivepriceshock
with no change in the nominal interest rate is contractionary in the US model. If this
is true, then in response to a positive price shock the Fed does not have to increase
the nominal interest rate more than the increase in inﬂation to achieve a contraction.
There will be a contraction even if there is no increase in the nominal interest rate at
all!
Judging interest rate rules can thus be sensitive to the economic model used.
Using an economic model in which positive price shocks are expansionary, as CGG
do, leads to a quite different conclusion than using a macroeconometric model like
the US model, where positive price shocks are contractionary. Using small calibrated
models to make policy conclusions may be risky if the models are at odds with more
empirically based models. It may be that the speciﬁcation and calibration have not
captured reality well.
Another interesting result is that the optimal control procedure with α = 9.0 does
not do much better than the estimated rule and is about tied with the .25 rule. In other
words, if the optimal control procedure is restricted to have an interest rate variability
about equal to the historical variability, little improvement over the estimated or .25
rules seems possible. If the estimated rule is a good approximation of Fed behavior,
then the Fed seems to be doing well.
276 Adding a Tax Rate Rule
A tax rate rule is proposed in this section that might help monetary policy in its
stabilization effort. The idea is that a particular tax rate or set of rates would be
automaticallyadjustedeachquarterasafunctionofthestateoftheeconomy. Congress
wouldvoteontheparametersofthetaxrateruleasitwasvotingonthegeneralbudget
plan, and the tax rate or set of rates would then become an added automatic stabilizer.
Consider, for example, the federal gasoline tax rate. If the short run demand for
gasoline is fairly price inelastic, a change in the after-tax price at the pump will have
only a small effect on the number of gallons purchased. In this case a change in the
gasoline tax rate is like a change in after-tax income. Another possibility would be a
national sales tax if such a tax existed. If the sales tax were broad enough, a change
in the sales tax rate would also be like a change in after-tax income.
For the results in this paper a constructed federal indirect business tax (IBT) rate
based on data from the national income and product accounts is used for the tax rate
rule. In practice a speciﬁc tax rate or rates, such as the gasoline tax rate, would have
to be used, and this would be decided by the political process. The constructed tax
rate for quarter t, denoted τt, is the ratio of overall federal indirect business taxes to
total consumption expenditures. In the regular version of the model τt is taken to be
exogenous.
The following equation is used for the tax rate rule:
τt = τ∗
t + 0.125[.5((Yt−1 − Y∗
t−1)/Y∗
t−1) + .5((Yt−2 − Y∗
t−2)/Y∗
t−2)]
+0.125 ∗ [.5( ˙ PFt−1 − ˙ PF
∗




28whereY denotesrealGDPand ˙ PFdenotesthepercentagechangeinaprivatenonfarm
price deﬂator. It is not realistic to have tax rates respond contemporaneously to the
economy, and so lags have been used in (7). Lags of both one and two quarters
have been used to smooth tax rate changes somewhat. The rule says that the tax rate
exceeds its base value as output and the inﬂation rate exceed their base values. PF is
usedinsteadoftheGDPdeﬂatorbecausebyconstructiontheGDPdeﬂatorisaffected
by indirect business taxes (and thus by τt).
Results using this rule along with the estimated interest rate rule are reported in
the ﬁfth line in Part 2 in Table 2. The use of the rule lowers L for real GDP from
2.76 when only the estimated interest rate rule is used to 2.37 when both rules are
used. The rule is thus of considerable help in lowering output variability. Although
not reported in Table 2, the rule does lower the variability of PF (from 3.61 to 3.42).
On the other hand, as shown in Table 2, it does not lower the variability of the GDP
deﬂator. This is because, as just mentioned, the GDP deﬂator is directly affected by
indirect business taxes. When the tax rate rule is used, the variability of indirect taxes
is greater, which, other things equal, increases the variability of the GDP deﬂator.
7 Conclusion
The main conclusions have been discussed at the end of Sections 2 and 5. They are
in brief: 1) The estimated interest rate rule passes a number of fairly stringent tests,
including the stability test. 2) When using the MC and US models, the Taylor rule
when compared to rules with smaller inﬂation coefﬁcients achieves a small reduction
29in inﬂation variability at a cost of a large increase in interest rate variability. Also,
interestrateruleswithsmallinﬂationcoefﬁcientsarenotdestabilizing. 3)Theoptimal
control procedure is not much of an improvement over the estimated rule.
Finally, it is interesting to note that even when both the estimated interest rate
rule and the tax rate rule are used, the values of L in Table 2 are nowhere close to
zero. Monetary policy even with the help of a ﬁscal policy rule cannot come close to
eliminating the effects of typical historical shocks. In this sense Fed power is quite
limited.
30Appendix
The MC and US Models
The MC Model
The MC model in Fair (1994) is used for the results in this paper. An updated version
of this model has been used for the present work, and this version is presented on
the website mentioned in the introductory footnote. There are 38 countries in the
MC model for which stochastic equations are estimated.19 There are 31 stochastic
equations for the United States and up to 15 each for the other countries. The total
number of stochastic equations is 363, and the total number of estimated coefﬁcients
is1650. Inaddition,thereare1050estimatedtradeshareequations. Thetotalnumber
of endogenous and exogenous variables, not counting the trade shares, is about 4500.




technique is two stage least squares except when there are too few observations to
make the technique practical, where ordinary least squares is used. The estimation
19The 38 countries are the United States, Canada, Japan, Austria, France, Germany, Italy, the
Netherlands, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, Finland, Australia, South Africa, Korea, Bel-
gium, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain, New Zealand, Saudi Arabia,
Venezuela, Colombia, Jordan, Syria, India, Malaysia, Pakistan, the Philippines, Thailand, China,
Argentina, Chile, Mexico, and Peru.
20The 21 other countries that ﬁll out the trade share matrix are Brazil, Turkey, Poland, Russia,
Ukraine, Egypt, Israel, Kenya, Bangladesh, Hong Kong, Singapore, Vietnam, Nigeria, Algeria,
Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, the UnitedArab Emirates, and an all other category.
31accounts for possible serial correlation of the error terms. The variables used for the
ﬁrst stage regressors for a country are the main predetermined variables in the model
for the country. A list of these variables is available from the website.21
There is a mixture of quarterly and annual data in the MC model. Quarterly
equations are estimated for 14 countries (the ﬁrst 14 in footnote 19), and annual
equations are estimated for the remaining 24. However, all the trade share equations
are quarterly. There are quarterly data on all the variables that feed into the trade
share equations, namely the exchange rate, the local currency price of exports, and
thetotalvalueofimportspercountry. Whenthemodelissolved, thepredictedannual
values of these variables for the annual countries are converted to predicted quarterly
values using a simple distribution assumption. The quarterly predicted values from
the trade share equations are converted to annual values by summation or averaging
when this is needed.
SincetheMCmodelisdiscussedindetailinFair(1994)andonthewebsite,itwill
not be discussed in detail here. The key properties of the model that are relevant for
present purposes are the effects of interest rates on the economy, and these properties
will now be outlined.
The main U.S. short term interest rate in the model is the three month Treasury
bill rate, which the Fed is assumed to control. This rate is denoted r in the text, but
RS in the model, and the RS notation will be used in this appendix. A change in RS
affects the U.S. economy in the following ways:
21Some of the equations in the model are changed beginning in 1999 to incorporate the EMU.
Beginning in 1999, the exchange rate equations of the individual EMU countries are replaced with
one exchange rate equation, and the individual interest rate rules are replaced with one rule.
321. Long term interest rates depend on current and lagged values of RS.
2. Interest rates appear as explanatory variables in the consumption, import, and
housing investment equations, all with negative coefﬁcient estimates.
3. Interest rates have a negative effect on stock prices in the stock price equation,
and stock prices appear in the consumption and housing investment equations
through a wealth variable, which has a positive effect on consumption and
housing investment.
4. Interest payments of ﬁrms and the government—and thus interest income of
households—changewheninterestrateschange,andhouseholdinterestincome
appearsintheconsumption, import, andhousinginvestmentequationsthrough
a disposable income variable, which has a positive effect in these equations.
5. A change in RS leads to a change in the value of the dollar vis-a-vis the other
major currencies through exchange rate equations—an increase in RS leads to
an appreciation of the dollar and a decrease leads to a depreciation. A change
in the value of the dollar leads to a change in U.S. import prices, which then
results in a change U.S. domestic prices through an import price variable in the
domestic price equation. The change in the value of the dollar also leads to a
change in the demand for U.S. exports through the trade share equations, and
it leads to a change in U.S. import demand through an import price variable in
the U.S. import equation.
6. RS appears as an explanatory variable in some of the other countries’ interest
rate rules, and so foreign interest rates in part follow U.S. rates.
Theneteffectsof,say,adecreaseinRS onU.S.outputandthepricelevelarepositive.
Output increases because there is an increase in the demand for U.S. domestically
produced goods, and the price level increases because of the increase in demand and
the depreciation of the dollar.22
22The dynamics of the estimated U.S. price equation in the model are discussed in Fair (2000).
An initial increase in the price level caused by changes in the explanatory variables or by positive
shocks leads to further increases in the price level in the future and thus to inﬂation. The inﬂation
generated from these changes eventually dies out.
33Theinterestincomeeffectlistedinpoint4aboveisnowfairlylargebecauseofthe
large stock of federal government debt that was accumulated in the 1980s and early
1990s. U.S. households own much of this debt, much of which is short term, and
so there is a large change in their interest income when interest rates change. This
positive income effect offsets some of the negative intertemporal substitution effect,
and so the net effect of an interest rate change on output is considerably smaller than
would be the case without the income effect. It is not easy empirically to link interest
rate changes to interest income changes in the national income accounts, and it may
be that the model has overestimated the income effect. Consequently, an alternative
version of the model has been used for some of the experiments, which treats interest
incomeasexogenous. Inthisversionthereisnointerestincomeeffectonhouseholds.
The US Model
The optimal control procedure and the use of rational expectations are too costly in
terms of computer time to be able to be used in the MC model. For this work a stand
alone model of the United States has been used. This US model is exactly the same
as the model for the United States in the MC model except for the treatment of U.S.
exports(EX)andtheU.S.priceofimports(PIM). Thesetwovariableschangewhen
RS changes—primarily because the value of the dollar changes—and the effects of
RS on EX and PIMwere approximated in the following way.
An experiment was run using the MC model in which the RS rule was dropped
and RS was decreased by one percentage point from its base value in 1999:1. The
values of RS from 1999:2 on were kept unchanged from the base values. (The base
34values are values from a forecast that was made using the MC model.) No other
changes were made to the MC model, which means, for example, that all the other
countries’ interest rate rules were retained. The MC model was solved for the RS
change for the 1999:1-2001:4 period, and the percentage deviations in EXand PIM
from their base values were recorded for each quarter. Let βi denote the percentage
deviation in EX in quarter i, and let γi denote the percentage deviation in PIM in
quarter i. i is 1 for 1999:1, 2 for 1999:2, and so on.
The approximating equation used for EX is:





where EX∗ is the base value of EX and RS∗ is the base value of RS. The approxi-
mating equation for PIMis:





where PIM∗ is the base value of PIM. If these two equations are added to the US
model, then any change in RS relative to its base values will change EX and PIM
relative to their base values, and the changes in EX and PIMwill be approximately
what would be the case in the MC model.
The US Model–RE Version
If agents use the model to form expectations of future values, then expectations are
saidtobe‘‘rational’’or‘‘modelconsistent.’’AmethodisproposedinFair(1993)for
35testing whether expectations are rational. Consider explaining a long term interest
rate as a function of expected future short term rates. If expected future short term
rates are assumed to depend on current and past short term rates, then the long term
rate can be regressed on current and past short term rates. This is done in the regular
version of the US model. If instead expectations of future short term rates are model
consistent, the explanatory variables in the long term rate equation are the model’s
predictionsofthefutureshorttermrates. Atestinthiscontextistoaddfuturevaluesof
theshorttermratetothelongtermrateequation,estimatetheequationbyaconsistent
method, and test the signiﬁcance of the future values. A limited information method
that can be used is Hansen’s (1982) method of moments, where the instruments used
are the main predetermined variables in the model.23
Tests of the kind just described have been performed on most of the estimated
equations in the MC model.24 The overall results are not generally supportive of
the rational expectations hypothesis in that in most cases the future values are not
signiﬁcant. (This includes future short term interest rate values in long term interest
rate equations.) An important exception, however, concerns the three consumption
equationsintheUSmodel—explainingrespectivelyservice, nondurable, anddurable
consumption—where future values of income are signiﬁcant.
To see how sensitive the results are to the treatment of expectations, a ‘‘rational
expectations’’ (RE) version of the US model was speciﬁed. In each of the three
consumption equations and in the import equation, the current value of income was
23An alternative, full information, method is FIML— see Fair (1993, p. 183).
24See the results in Chapters 5 and 6 in Fair (1994) and updated results on the website.
36replaced with the value of income led one, two, three, and four quarters. In addition
(althoughthetestsdonotsupportthis),eachofthetwolongterminterestrateequations
(explaining theAAA bond rate and a mortgage rate) was replaced with an equation in
which the long term rate is equal to the average of the current short term rate and the
one- through seven-quarter-ahead short term rates. The coefﬁcients that were used
for these equations are discussed in Section 5. The RE version of the US model was
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